排序方式: 共有278条查询结果,搜索用时 62 毫秒
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定性定量相结合是战争设计工程的技术基础,为了探讨定性定量相结合中的如何从定量到定性进行反思,提出了定量评价干预策略的一致性检验方法;研究了从定量到定性反思的实现方法。最后以一个实例说明了整个从定量到定性进行反思的过程,并证实该反思方法是有效可行的。 相似文献
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Mihail Naydenov 《Defense & Security Analysis》2018,34(1):93-112
Russia has long been pursuing an intended and calculated policy of keeping enough influence in Bulgaria in order to have control over national decisions. Together with the economic, energy, political and information tools used by Russia in its hybrid war against Bulgaria and in its bid to achieve an enduring “state capture,” defence is also a distinct target of Russian subversion now. A list of noticeable subversive actions with tangible effects can be summarised, ranging from fuelling division and manipulating public opinion, preventing the strengthening of the NATO position in the Black Sea, sabotaging defence reform to various options of subverting the modernisation of the Bulgarian Armed Forces and seeking new ways to keep legacy Soviet military equipment in operation as long as possible. This issue must be urgently addressed both nationally and in NATO. 相似文献
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Grand strategic theorists share an historical emphasis on interstate conflict, yet in contrast to the more frequent intrastate conflicts, these represent only 7 of the some 273 US military deployments since 1900. We argue that these intrastate conflicts limit the utility of regional balances of power in mitigating forms of conflict that the US may consider inimical to its national security interests. When considering potential changes to US force posture and grand strategy, American coercive statecraft should be theorised along a broader strategic continuum encompassing the full range of conflict. 相似文献
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基于兰彻斯特作战理论,提出了一个新的微分对策模型来研究在交战双方均有信息战系统协助作战的条件下的最优火力分配策略。又运用微分对策理论对该模型进行分析和求解,并对所得到的结论作出符合战术意义的解释。 相似文献
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GPS在导航战中的作用及其干扰对抗研究 总被引:8,自引:1,他引:7
论述导航战的作用和军用范围,进攻导航战的目标和防御导航战的措施以及GPS系统中C/A码的扩展和加密应用,新码的发展和抗干扰能力。并通过应用实例进一步论述对GPS接收机的干扰原理和干扰效果分析以及美、俄两国发展GPS干扰机的技术现状。 相似文献
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Martin Rink 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2014,25(4):828-842
In the Age of Napoleon, ‘small wars’ and ‘revolutionary war’ were closely connected. There were, however, different strands of this phenomenon: speaking professionally, conservative officers condemned small wars as an irregular regression to previous less disciplined forms of warfare. The Prussian state continually tried to discipline and regulate spontaneous risings. Yet the irregular character of small wars offered the opportunities for a less complex way of fighting, thus enabling the arming of the ‘people’ to fight. Individual undertakings, such as Ferdinand von Schill's doomed campaign in 1809, were designed to spark off a general popular uprising. But they were cheered by many and supported by few. Meanwhile, Neidhardt von Gneisenau conceived guerrilla-style Landsturm home-defence forces, which were designed for an irregular people's war. These concepts were put into practice in the ‘war of freedom’ – or ‘war of liberation’ – in 1813. Eventually both the mobilisation and the tactics remained regular, however, despite the emphatic appeal to a national ‘people's war’. 相似文献